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It is indeed a privilege to be asked to comment on Professor Thomas
Pettigrew’s article on the causes of prejudice and the psycho-social
conditions for overcoming it.  Pettigrew gives us in his article a clear
summary of a several decades-long research study on conditions giving rise
to prejudice, laying out the most relevant findings – ones that have survived 
multiple challenges – and their most successful applications. 
In the spirit of furthering academic discussion on the topic, this
commentary will attempt to remark on the author’s model and its
implications, outlining a viewpoint based on several different theoretical
traditions and sources.
By way of focus, Pettigrew’s model distinguishes between manifest and
latent prejudice, taking into account three causal levels: structural, contextual
and individual. 
This being said, specifically how prejudice works and what its
relationship is to stereotypes are two points that are not, in my opinion,
sufficiently clear. Saying, on the one hand, that stereotypes answer to the
cognoscitive level in categorically organizing information coming from social
perception, and on the other hand, that prejudice refers to affective reactions
towards the stereotyped object, does not respond to information processing
processes and the manner in which the brain functions. Cognoscitive
processing goes hand in hand with affective processing; that is to say, in
order for each element of cognition to be evaluated there must be an
element of affect.  If we look at how the brain works, the formation of an
element of cognition ensues from the activation of a neural system with
specific intensities that permit linkage of specific neuronal groups; this
activity implies a parallel restriction, constraint or inhibition of other neural
sets or systems (Thagard and Kunda, 1998; Tononi and Edelman, 1998). 
This activation-inhibition process which assumes different amounts of
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intensity refers to affective responses, which vary according to the level of 
consciousness, or how automatically the cognitions are formed.
Two consequences can be derived from this: 1) all stereotypes imply in 
turn affective responses of diverse natures. Only in this manner can social
categorization processes be activated.  All perceptions, evaluations and
actions towards groups or people entail an attitude of attention, suggest
variable response times, and evoke sympathetic nervous system reactions
that imminently refer to affective reactions.
At this level, the difference between stereotype and prejudice is found
rather on the threshold of consciousness and in the possibility or lack 
thereof of triggering attributive mechanisms that not only allow for
constructing or reconstructing stereotype theories but also make it possible
to grant meaning to affective responses – which stop being so in order to 
become emotions.
A stereotype can therefore be understood as a function of the
relationship between the set of activated features and concomitant affective
responses proper to a categorization process operating below the threshold
of consciousness.  Prejudice, on the other hand, would be the process of 
stereotyping that takes place above the threshold of consciousness, implying
activation of mechanisms for causal attribution of the stereotype and a
concomitant emotional response.
It is precisely at this point where socio-cognoscitive neurosciences
intertwines with socially distributed cognition models (Ochsner and 
Liberman, 2001; Smith and Semin, 2004). This refers to the fact that the 
attributive process inputs are precisely the ideological discrimination systems
present in a society that lead precisely to derogatory explanations.   Said 
ideological systems are spread in the form of ingenuous theories in different
types of communicative contexts, whether face to face or in the framework
of mass communication. Neuronal systems and social systems interlink in a 
single social network for generating knowledge – a network in which
affective and emotive processes are implied, as occurs in all communicative
contact.
This said, how can we explain that at a socio-cognoscitive level, the
justifying content of denigrating stereotypes is precisely certain ideological
systems? The answer may come precisely from a basic evolutionary process
of social categorization that allows not only for classifying people and human
groups by features or attributes, but also for differentiating them from each
other.  Of interest is that this is a fundamental mechanism for both social
recognition and exclusion or social discrimination. Both recognition and
derogatory theories are assumed to be distributed communicatively in
modern societies (Honneth, 1994); however, it is the dominant societal 
norms in any particular context that determine the prominent theory.
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Two more points can be derived from these considerations of Prof.
Pettigrew’s article. The first has to do with the assumption of an
authoritarian personality as a prejudice-sustaining explanation at the
individual level. This personality presupposes different sets of attitudes and
acquired features, the combination of which allows us to understand how the
individual acts. Authoritarianism makes reference, rather, to a system of
societal norms aimed at legitimizing social hierarchies and culturally
constructed dehumanizing criteria (Leyens).  In an authoritarian context, for
example, different personality variations would allow for legitimizing said
system of norms. To talk about an authoritarian personality is, on the one
hand, to psychologize a social ideology, and on the other to incur in the risk
of socio-biologizing cultural patterns.
The second point refers to the conditions for reducing prejudice
through contact – conditions which have been clearly documented and
stated by the author. The effect of contact can only be understood in the
framework of the same categorization processes that form the basis for
human organization in society. By means of contact, the mechanisms of
prejudice stop operating, since the norms and theories that allowed for
attribution of the outgroup’s behavior have changed. The derogatory
theories have been replaced by recognition theories; for this there has been a 
recurrence to mechanisms such as cognoscitive dissonance and inhibitory
control as a result of changes in the conditions and communication content.
The neuronal systems involved in the process of social perception would
vary in both activation of the information nodes sustaining it and the
associated affective reactions. The categorization process remains the same,
but this time it works to the favor of social recognition.
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